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• Abstract Technology largely determines economic development and its impact 
on the environment; yet technological change is one of the least developed parts of 
existing global change models. This paper reviews two approaches developed at the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, both of which use the concept of 
technological learning and aid modeling of technological change. The first approach is 
a micromodel ("bottom-up") of three electricity generation technologies that rigorously 
endogenizes technological change by incorporating both uncertainty (stochasticity) and 
learning into the model's decision rules . This model, with its endogenous technolog-
ical change, allows radical innovations to penetrate the energy market and generates 
S-shaped patterns of technological diffusion that are observed in the real world. The 
second approach is a macro ("top-down") model that consists of coupled economic- and 
technological-system models . Although more stylistic in its representation of endoge-
nous technological change, the macro model can be applied on a worldwide scale and 
can generate long-term scenarios that are critical for policy analysis. Both the micro-
and macro models generate radical departures from currently dominant technological 
systems ("surprises"), including long-term scenarios with low carbon and sulfur emis-
sions. Our focus is modeling, but for policy, the work underscores the need for huge 
investments before environmentally superior technologies can compete in the market. 
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Introduction 
Changes in products, devices, processes and practices-technology (!)-largely 
determine the development and consequences of industrial society. Historical 
evidence (1-4) and economic theory (5-8) confirm that advancing technological 
knowledge is the most important single factor that contributes to long-term produc-
tivity and economic growth (9-11). Technology is also central to long-term and 
chronic environment and development problems now on policy agendas world-
wide under the heading of "global change." We focus on energy, the principal 
cause of atmospheric global changes that include greenhouse warming caused by 
energy-related emissions of carbon dioxide. 
Although technology is central, technological change is typically among the 
least satisfactory parts of global-change modeling. Each of the factors that deter-
mine the wide range in projected emissions of carbon dioxide-the future level 
of economic activity, energy required for each unit of economic output, and the 
carbon emitted for each unit of energy consumed (12)-is a function of technol-
ogy. Indeed, varied technology assumptions largely account for the wide range of 
published emission estimates for the year 2100, which span 2 gigatons (1 gigaton 
equals 1015 g of elemental carbon) to well above 40 gigatons of carbon (12, 13). 
Low-emission scenarios envision, for example, massive use of biomass (which, if 
sustainable, has zero net emissions), wind, solar, or nuclear power (e.g. see the 
"C" scenarios in 14). High-emission scenarios envision massive use of coal and, 
in some cases, coal-based synthetic liquid fuels. 
Most studies of global change rely on macroeconomic models with simplified 
representation of the energy system. Although attractive for large-scale and long-
term analysis because they are compact, these highly aggregated models are unable 
to represent how particular technologies are developed and selected. Rather, they 
typically include aggregate trend parameters that are set exogenously to account 
for improvements in energy efficiency and other technological changes. Thus, by 
design, they estimate the future as a marginal and gradual extension of the past. Yet 
radical shifts in technological regimes and surprises are numerous in the historical 
record, such as the introduction of steam power in the eighteenth century, the 
emergence of electricity in the nineteenth century, and the entry of nuclear power in 
the twentieth century. Typically, the main endogenous mechanism of technological 
change in macroeconomic energy models has been depletion of resources, which 
triggers use of new resource-frugal "backstop" technologies (15). Yet exhaustion 
of energy resources, such as running out of oil, is not evident ( 16, 17), especially 
when considering the large potential availability of unconventional oil and gas 
resources such as oil shale, tar sands, or methane hydrates (18). (For a somewhat 
contrasting view on the availability of conventional oil resources, see 19.) 
Even models in the tradition of systems engineering-in which detailed in-
formation on technological costs and performance is used to calculate least cost 
technological systems-have largely failed to incorporate endogenous technolog-
ical change. Some ignore changes in costs and performance and thus implicitly 
MODELING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 547 
assume that technologies are static, with Malthusian results (20, 21 ). Most impose 
those changes exogenously but have no mechanism---other than the intuition of 
the modeler-to ensure that the assumptions imposed are plausible and internally 
consistent. Very few systems models have included rudimentary mechanisms of 
technological change that are endogenous to the model's decision rules, such as 
uncertainty or technological learning (22-25). Moreover, such models have been 
criticized because they compute technological systems with reference only to the 
costs of technologies themselves and do not account for the macroeconomic con-
text, such as prices and the opportunity costs of capital, that also affects patterns 
and levels of technological investment. A more elaborate discussion is presented 
elsewhere (26). For further review of the literature on technology and global 
change, see also Azar & Dowlatabadi (27) in this volume. 
We review two modeling innovations developed at the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) that advance the modeling of technological 
change. One is a model of technological learning that endogenizes technologi-
cal choices and simulates microscale technological changes. That approach in-
corporates learning and uncertainty-which critically affect decisions to develop 
and deploy technologies in the real world-into model decision rules rather than 
through exogenous trend parameters. Technological learning can drive down tech-
nology costs, and models of cost minimization will take up new technologies once 
their costs have fallen . The important improvement is that the model knows that 
learning requires anticipatory investments, hence improved technology does not 
come for free . The model also recognizes the inherent uncertainties in technolog-
ical learning by treating learning rates as stochastic. One consequence is a model 
structure that autonomously generates radical technological changes. The other 
approach presented here is a stylized application of learning concepts to analysis 
of global energy systems. It is made possible by coupling a systems engineering 
model (parameters were established with the help a database of 1600 energy tech-
nologies) with a macroeconomic model. The result is a modeling framework that 
accounts for changing technology systems as well as the macroeconomic context. 
Both techniques put choices of individual technologies into the model decision 
rules , and thus both generate technological change from within. Their essential 
feature is that they treat technology as dynamic and as endogenous. Technologies 
are allowed to improve over time, but improvements are strictly contingent on 
earlier investments, without which technological change does not occur. In both 
models, technology choice is based on criteria of technical performance (e.g. 
efficiency and ability to meet a given energy demand) and technology costs. Both 
models minimize energy systems costs, subject to either stochastic uncertainty or 
additional exogenous constraints that represent capital shortages and infrastructure 
bottlenecks that prevent "unlimited" growth of new technologies. Both models 
represent detailed capital vintage structures and hence are able to represent the 
additional costs of a premature retirement of capital vintages in case of hasty forced 
introduction of new technologies. The models also depend on some additional 
exogenous choices (notably future energy demand) and thus do not completely 
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solve the vexing problem of how to model fully endogenous technological change, 
but they indicate promising paths forward. 
We argue that progress in technological modeling requires a multitude of highly 
sophisticated models and methodologies. Although our goal is improved endoge-
nous modeling of technological change, the results have implications for policy. 
If radically new technologies are to be deployed in competitive markets, massive 
hedged premarket investment is needed. Most public policy focuses on investing 
in R&D, but the needed investments to improve technologies through experience 
(learning) gained in niche markets is equally vital and typically much costlier. The 
accumulation of experience is necessary to improve technologies and make them 
commercially viable. Yet care is needed to preserve diversity and avoid excess 
premature investment in technologies that might fail. To solve the problems of 
global change requires investments in many radical new technologies because, 
only an unknown few will ultimately be chosen by commercial markets. 
Technological Learning 
The innovations in modeling technological change that are presented here depend, 
in part, on adding to models the process of "technological learning," which is the 
improvement in cost and performance caused by experience gained by individ-
uals and organizations working with technologies. Typically, new technologies 
are uncompetitive when introduced (28). Investments into R&D can improve the 
flexibility, performance, and competitiveness of a new technology to a point where 
it can be tested in demonstration projects. What we term the "innovation stage" is 
the span from the idea for a new technology to the point of demonstration. R&D, 
along with demonstration projects, can yield sufficient improvements in immature 
technologies that they become competitive in small niche markets in which the 
new technology has a unique, specialized advantage over existing technologies. 
Examples include the speed and range of jet airplanes over piston-powered aircraft, 
and the affordability of solar photovoltaic (PV) power in mountain huts and on 
lighted road signs where wire connections to the conventional electric grid are too 
costly. In this "niche market stage" technologies are not (yet) commercially viable 
for widespread use in the energy system, but they are sold on a commercial basis 
for specialized applications that allow accumulation of experience that can lower 
costs further and make the immature technology commercially viable in a wider 
market. Because of the ambiguity of being both commercial and noncommercial, 
we treat this stage with a single term-niche markets. A stage of "pervasive dif-
fusion" follows for those technologies that become sufficiently competitive that 
they are selected in widespread commercial applications. This simple three-phase 
typology-innovation, niche markets, and diffusion-forms a conceptual frame-
work based on the mechanism at work. In practice, the phases overlap and interact. 
A rigorous model of technological change must be able to account for the fac-
tors that govern the improvement and selection of technologies that are still in 
their early stages of development-before demonstration projects and commer-
MODELING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 549 
cial installations-as well as after new technologies become commercially viable. 
Over the extended periods considered in this paper-five decades and beyond-
some of these immature technologies will improve sufficiently so that they will 
survive in the marketplace. Including these technologies in models is vital be-
cause they are most different from the existing dominant technologies, and their 
widespread use will have a radical impact on global changes. To model these 
innovative technologies the learning curve concept must be extended upstream to 
include R&D investments that lead to improved cost and performance during the 
early, innovation stage. Typically, learning curves have included only improve-
ments that are the result of working with installed technologies. Improvements 
during both the innovation and niche market stages which are intensive in R&D 
are usually excluded. In the model presented here both sources of technology im-
provements R&D as well as learning-by-doing through installing technologies are 
included. In our view, the result is a technological learning concept that is tractable 
and conceptually coherent-it offers a means of improving energy models so that 
they can more accurately reflect both incremental and radical technological change. 
However, it is not the only possible method for modeling technological change. 
Other analysts-notably Goulder and colleagues (29-31 )-have sought to model 
the knowledge production process that occurs during R&D as a basis for model-
ing technological change. At this early period in efforts to model technological 
change, a multitude of methods is needed. 
The "technological learning" phenomenon was first described and quantified for 
the aircraft industry by Wright (32), who reported that unit labor costs in airframe 
manufacturing declined significantly with accumulated experience measured by 
cumulative production (output). Technological learning has since been analyzed 
empirically for numerous manufacturing and service activities (e.g. shipbuilding, 
petrochemicals, steam and gas turbines, farming of broiler chickens), and studies 
have also applied learning concepts to analysis of a wide range of other human 
activities (e.g. the success rates of new surgical procedures, productivity in kibbutz 
farming, and reliability of nuclear plant operation) (33). In economics, "learning 
by doing" and "learning by using" have been highlighted since the early 1960s 
(34, 35). 
Learning phenomena are generally described in the form of learning or ex-
perience curves. Unit costs of production typically decline at a decreasing rate 
as experience is gained, and thus learning curves generally take the form of a 
power function in which unit costs decrease exponentially as a function of cumu-
lative output. Other proxy measures for experience include installed hardware and 
cumulative investments. The resulting curve is often plotted on logarithmically 
scaled axes so that it becomes a straight line. The learning rate-the slope of the 
line-is the percentage decline in costs per doubling of accumulated experience. 
This formulation should not be mistaken as indefinitive "linear" progress. Each 
doubling of output (investments) takes more time (resources), and thus learning 
curves exhibit decreasing marginal returns and long-term saturation of cost im-
provements for mature technologies. Learning rates in manufacturing, including 
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Figure 1 Learning curves for several electricity generation technologies. Shown are gas 
turbines, which are an "incremental" technology on the cusp of pervasive diffusion and two 
higher-cost technologies: PVs and advanced windmills. These two most costly technologies 
are "radical" in that they are competitive only in special niche markets and thus their market 
share is low, but both hold promise for lower costs with additional investments. Learning rates 
for all three technologies in their precommercial stage are comparable ( '"'-'20% per doubling 
of capacity). (Sources: 36, 84.) 
production of energy-related technologies, mainly vary from 10% to 30%. For 
some technologies, typically in the earliest period of development, learning rates 
approaching 50% have been observed (36). 
Figure 1 shows typical learning curves for three electricity-generating technolo-
gies: gas turbines, solar PVs, and wind turbines. Learning curves for technologies 
that have survived to widespread diffusion, such as gas turbines, typically consist 
of two segments. The first corresponds with the early stage-from the innovation 
(adapted from jet aircraft engines) in the 1950s to the middle 1960s when the 
first demonstration projects had been built and gas turbines entered niche markets . 
Cost reductions were rapid ( '"'-'20% per doubling of the small installed capacity of 
demonstration projects); gas turbines were a truly radical technology-extremely 
expensive, but promising if substantial risky investments were made. The second 
segment, from the middle 1960s until 1980, is marked by smaller cost reductions for 
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each doubling of experience, which is characteristic of expanding niche markets. 
Leaming rates were ~ 10%. During that period the technology was costlier than 
its alternatives but became increasingly competitive through continued improve-
ments that were sustained by substantial investments. Overall, the cost per unit of 
capacity declined by a factor of four as cumulative experience rose three orders 
of magnitude. Since 1980 gas turbines have been an incremental technology-
increasingly applied in commercial markets as one component of the electricity 
generation system. Today, gas turbines in combined cycle power plants are the 
preferred technology for most electricity generation applications with natural gas 
and are in the midst of pervasive diffusion. 
The mechanisms for learning by doing are numerous. They include experi-
ence gained by individuals in performing repetitive tasks, improvement in the 
functioning of organizations (e.g. plant management, logistics, and marketing), 
refinement of design, and economies of scale (37). However, improvements in 
upstream technologies and other factors are, like learning, also correlated with 
growing experience and also yield improved costs and performance. The analyst 
must thus be careful to use the learning concept only when the causal mechanisms 
of learning are at work. For example, it appears that learning by doing requires 
continuous experience, not merely the accumulation of output regardless of its time 
path. Unit costs of the Lockheed LlOll "Tristar" aircraft rose in the late 1970s, 
when production resumed after a drastic reduction that included large-scale lay-
offs at production facilities. Experience gained during the early 1970s was lost 
with the staff turnover; as a result, the planes built in the early 1980s were in 
real terms more expensive than those built in the early 1970s. Moreover, learning 
rates are uncertain and vary enormously-from 50% improvement per doubling 
of output to 10% deterioration (i.e. negative learning, discussed in 33). Leaming 
curves neatly capture the complicated phenomena in simple functions that allow 
improved modeling, but they do not eliminate the need ultimately to model each 
causal mechanism of technological change individually nor do they eliminate the 
need to address the uncertainty that agents face when making investment decisions. 
Despite overwhelming empirical evidence and solid theoretical underpinnings, 
learning phenomena as discussed above have been explicitly introduced into only 
a few models of intertemporal choice. A first detailed model formulation w~s 
suggested by Nordhaus & van der Heyden to assess the potential benefits of en-
hanced R&D efforts in new energy technology (the fast breeder reactor) (22). 
Computational limitations at that time precluded the application of the model to 
a wider portfolio of technologies in the model formulation. A first full-scale op-
erational optimization model incorporating systematic technological learning of 
energy technologies was first developed at the IIASA (24, 38). But that formu-
lation, which incorporated learning rates for up to a dozen advanced electricity-
generating technologies into a linear programming model of the global energy 
system, was limited. Leaming rates were assumed ex ante, and future technol-
ogy costs in the model depended solely on the amount of intervening investments 
in installed capacity. The model excluded uncertainty as well as R&D efforts as 
sources of technological change. The result was that the optimization (with perfect 
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foresight) identified the most promising technologies and invested in them heavily 
and early. In the real world, however, learning rates and other parameters are 
not known perfectly and thus competitive firms invest in portfolios and exercise 
caution. 
A Microlevel Model of Technological Learning 
Here we illustrate a model (39) and some key results that reflect our interpretation 
of the two fundamental sources of technological change: (a) investments made by 
competitive firms into immature technologies in anticipation of improved perfor-
mance and lower costs, and (b) diversification and hedging of those investments 
because of pervasive uncertainties. The purpose of this new model is to extend the 
traditional approach to modeling energy technologies, in which technical change 
is induced only by relative resource and factor endowments and price changes 
(40-43). 
The model is based on technological learning. However, it is inappropriate to 
build a model of technological change on conventional learning curves, such as 
in Figure 1. Such curves include only investments that yield installed capacity 
(including noncommerical demonstration projects). They omit R&D, which also 
plays a vital role in technological improvement. The cost of PVs produced in 
Japan, for example, was halved between 1973 and 1976, but this improvement is 
not evident in Figure 1 because it was before any installation of demonstration 
units and, thus, the cumulative installed capacity was zero. Two revisions are 
needed: (a) to account for investments in R&D as well as installed capacity and 
(b) to account for uncertainty in the payoff (learning) from such investments. 
Expanding learning curves to include R&D requires data that typically have 
commercial value and thus usually are scarce in the public record. One of the few 
reliable sources of technology-specific R&D expenditures is Watanabe's analysis 
of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry's "sunshine" technol-
ogy program to promote new energy technologies such as solar PVs (44, updated 
with personal communication). His data set is unique because it includes private 
R&D expenditures as well as more readily available data on public R&D. It also 
includes investments in demonstration projects and niche markets. His data make 
possible a more comprehensive form of the "learning curve," shown in Figure 2. 
The independent variable is cumulative expenditure, which includes R&D as well 
as niche market investments (39). Over the period 1973-1995, a total of 206 bil-
lion yen ( ~ US$2.5 billion in 1995 prices and exchange rates) was spent on PV s 
in Japan. Of that amount, 78% (162 billion yen) was investment in PV electricity-
generating capacity, and 22% (44 billion yen) was in R&D proper. The figure 
confirms that, once a technology reaches the niche market stage, investments in 
hardware (i.e. installed capacity) dominate, but that R&D remains a significant 
part of total investments. Moreover, R&D and niche market investments cannot 
be treated as separate, independent sources of technological improvements. Only 
when R&D and niche market investments are combined is the result a compre-
hensive learning curve that spans from innovation through niche markets. [We are 
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Figure 2 Modified learning curve for PV technologies. The curve shows decline in costs 
as a function of cumulative investments, including not only cumulative installations from 
demonstration projects and commercial niche markets but also R&D investments. Conven-
tional learning curves include only commercial installations and ignore other investments. 
At the early stages, when physical installations are few, R&D is relatively important. The 
declining costs of PVs correlate well with aggregate R&D investments and are comparable 
with a classic learning curve pattern with 54% reduction in costs for each doubling of cu-
mulative investment. This formulation allows a single, simple learning curve to be used to 
model cost reductions from the innovation stage, as well as later commercial stages. (Note 
that these curves are not directly comparable with Figure 1 because the independent variables 
and the currency units differ.) Sources: 44 and Watanabe, personal communication. 
mindful of the importance of interindustry and cross-national R&D spillover ef-
fects (45), including those from purchases of equipment (46), which are excluded 
from Watanabe's data and our first effort to extend the learning curve concept. 
Such effects are notoriously difficult to quantify. For more on connections and 
competition between R&D efforts see 29.) 
This extension of the learning-curve concept has two important features . One is 
that it can be used directly in models that compute relationships between resource 
allocation and changing costs of technologies. Such relationships are crucial for 
technological modeling because it is the anticipation of cost improvements that 
entices competitive agents to invest in immature technologies. Those costs partially 
determine which technologies markets select for application. This new curve is 
also conceptually coherent. It includes both of the major sources of technological 
improvement-investments in R&D and experience gained through technology 
deployment (installations) in niche markets. 
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In addition to this new comprehensive learning curve, uncertainty is also built 
into the model decision rules. The exact links in the chain of relationships-from 
investments to learning to cost reductions to market application to environmental 
consequences-are rarely known ex ante. The importance of technological un-
certainty has been recognized and explored ever since the earliest days of global 
environmental modeling (15, 47). Different approaches have been followed for 
analyzing the impacts of technological uncertainty, including the formulation of 
alternative scenarios (48,49), analysis of model sensitivity to input parameters 
(15, 50, 51), and sensitivity analysis based on elicitation of expert opinion (52). 
Such approaches allow assessment of the sensitivity of model outcomes to varia-
tions in uncertain model input parameters or some exploration of optimal manage-
ment strategies, such as strategies that emphasize adjustment of policy decisions 
over time as uncertainties are resolved (53-55). But uncertainty (stochasticity) is 
not built into the decision framework, and thus the deterministic models are unable 
to identify investment strategies that are robust or optimal when decision-makers 
simultaneously and continuously face many uncertain choices. Several stochastic 
approaches exist, but only a few modeling groups have applied stochastic opti-
mization techniques (e.g. 25, 56). 
The combined approach-incorporation of learning and uncertainty-has re-
quired the application of models that are mathematically cumbersome involving, 
simultaneously, stochasticity and recursive formulations. Moreover, the math-
ematical solutions are nonconvex, which is especially difficult to handle in tra-
ditional optimization models and algorithms. Technological learning is a classic 
example of increasing returns-the more learning takes place, the better a technol-
ogy's performance, which attracts further investment and learning. However, the 
rate of learning is uncertain. The IIASA approach is based on a general methodol-
ogy for handling uncertainty in optimization problems through a stochastic sam-
pling technique described by Ermoliev & Wets (57) and the improved algorithm 
developed by Ermoliev (personal communication). Our colleagues at IIASA have 
already applied that stochastic optimization framework in the MESSAGE techno-
logical optimization model (58). They have also developed a simple version of the 
MESSAGE model with learning curves (24). The model presented here merges 
the two approaches-stochasticity and learning. Similar mathematical and con-
ceptual problems also have been addressed in work on path dependence, in which 
initial decisions lead to multiplying network effects and increasing returns from 
the adoption of a particular technological solution (59). 
The conceptually simple model represents a rising demand for one homogenous 
good, electricity, which can be supplied by three hypothetical technology types-
"mature," "incremental," and "radical"-that correspond to three prominent elec-
tricity technologies available today. The mature technology is in widespread dif-
fusion; its characteristics (costs and resource conversion efficiency) do not change 
over time. Conventional coal-fired power stations with thermal efficiency of 30% 
and mean capital costs of US$1000/kW electric power capacity [Kw(e)] are a 
typical mature technology. The incremental technology has a slight efficiency 
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advantage over the mature technology, is initially more costly (by a factor of 2), 
and has a potential mean learning rate assumed at 10% for each doubling of cu-
mulative production capacity. A current example includes advanced coal-fired 
power stations with fluidized bed boilers and all basic environmental equipment 
(e.g. precipitators and sulfur and NOx removal units), with thermal efficiency of 
40% and mean initial capital costs of US$2000/kW(e). The model includes one 
resource; it corresponds with coal, for which known reserves and resources exceed 
200 years and exhibit rising extraction costs as the most accessible and highest-
quality reserves are depleted. The radical technology requires few resources and 
thus offers a substantial efficiency premium, but it is a factor of 40 more costly than 
the mature technology. However, as is common with radical new technologies, it 
has high potential for technological learning-a mean learning rate of 30% (per 
doubling of capacity) is assumed, which is consistent with historical experience. 
Contemporary examples of radical electric technologies include PV cells, which 
use an inexhaustible resource (sunlight) but are initially very costly-a starting 
value of US$40,000/kW(e) that was characteristic of PV costs in the early 1970s 
is used in the model simulations. 
The model treats the learning rates for the incremental and radical technologies 
as uncertain, represented by a lognormal distribution function around the mean 
value. For the radical technology, the variance of the distribution function is three 
times that of the incremental technology, which reflects the much higher spread 
of uncertainty associated with truly revolutionary technologies. Each uncertain 
value is sampled simultaneously; deviations from the expected (mean) value (of the 
distribution function of unknown learning rates) are added as extra cost or benefit 
term to an overall objective function; the least-cost solution from numerous draws 
is the optimal "hedging strategy" for technological investments in our single agent 
model. (For detail on assumptions and methods, including sensitivity analysis, 
see 39.) 
Figure 3 shows the results-the share of electricity supplied by each technology 
-for four simulations. If technology is treated as static (no learning), then the 
more efficient incremental technology replaces the mature technology as resource 
depletion leads to rising energy prices. The results are typical of optimization 
models that deploy the concept of a "backstop" technology. A second run, termed 
"exogenous learning," assumes that the cost of the incremental technology falls 
at an exogenously determined rate. The result is typical for simple optimization 
models-a new technology diffuses rapidly and widely at the moment it becomes 
cheaper than alternatives. Indeed, large-scale technology optimization models, 
which are widely used to assess the costs of abating various environmental prob-
lems, display similar "flip-flop" behavior. Published runs typically do not illustrate 
such behavior only because additional constraints, such as restrictions on the rate 
and pattern of technological diffusion, tuned according to the modeler's sense of 
plausibility, are widely used to make the outputs appear more realistic. Like 
sausage, the final product is evidently tasty, but the method of producing it is 
best left shrouded in mystery. 
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Figure 3 A simple optimization model with endogenous technological change. This fig-
ure shows the fractions of total installed generating capacity supplied by new (incremental 
and radical) electricity-generating technologies. These differ in their current costs as well 
as possibilities of future cost reductions (learning). Four simulation runs are shown: ( 1) 
static-technology costs and performance for all technologies; (2) exogenously given cost 
improvements for incremental technologies; ( 3) certain (deterministic) learning rates for 
incremental and radical technologies; and (4) uncertain learning rates for incremental and 
radical technologies. Without endogenous learning, the radical technology never earns mar-
ket shares. When the rate of learning is certain (i.e. known with perfect foresight), the 
optimal solution is to invest heavily and early in new technologies because the resulting cost 
declines through learning render the technology quickly competitive. When learning rates 
are uncertain, the optimal solution is more cautious. The (symmetrically declining) market 
shares for the existing, mature technology are not shown on this figure to improve clarity. 
(Source: 39.) 
A third run in Figure 3 shows the effect of adding learning with zero uncer-
tainty-termed "deterministic learning." A fourth run illustrates "uncertain learn-
ing"-it fully incorporates uncertainty (stochasticity) and learning, and thus it 
is the full model of endogenous technological change. In both of these runs the 
addition of learning leads the radical technology to enter the market. In the de-
terministic case a new technology enters the market earlier and diffuses more 
rapidly. But when learning is uncertain, diffusion is more gradual, and market 
entry is later; the model hedges its investments because the benefits are uncertain. 
Analysis of the historical record shows that technological diffusion, measured by 
the share of a market served by a technology, follows an S-shaped pattern charac-
teristic of logistic competition (26). Initially, market share grows slowly; as the 
share rises, the rate of diffusion accelerates; diffusion slows again as the point of 
saturation is reached (60-64). Only the uncertain-learning run demonstrates this 
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Figure 4 Endogenous technological change with uncertain carbon constraints and uncertain 
demand. This figure shows new capacity additions for three simulation runs: (a) base case 
with cost improvements caused by uncertain rates of learning (same as run 4 in Figure 3); 
(b) addition of an uncertain carbon constraint (see text); and (c) addition of the possibility 
that demand for electricity will be substantially higher or lower than expected in the base 
case simulation. Source: reference 39. 
S-shaped diffusion pattern. That run is also consistent with the observation that 
radical technological changes in the energy system (and other large-scale systems 
in which "inertia" is omnipresent) require many decades (26, 65). 
Figure 4 shows the results when an uncertain possibility of a constraint on 
emissions-represented by a carbon tax-is added to the model. For illustra-
tion, the simulation assumes that there is a 1-in-3 chance that some tax would be 
implemented sometime in the future; if the tax is implemented, the probability 
of introduction by 2050 is assumed to be 50%, rising to 99% by the year 2100. 
The level of the tax is also uncertain, represented by an asymmetric (Weibull) 
distribution around the mean expected value of the tax (US$50/ton of carbon) to 
represent the low probability of an extremely high tax. The probability that the 
tax will exceed US$125/ton of carbon is < 1 %. The existence of this uncertain 
environmental constraint shifts investments into new, less-polluting technologies 
earlier in time. For comparison, Figure 4 also shows the results if future de-
mand is treated as uncertain-higher or lower-than in the base case runs in 
Figure 3. These three types of uncertainty shown in Figures 3 and 4-leaming, 
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em1ss10ns constraints, and demand-are the most important unknowns for the 
energy sector. In all three, earlier and larger investments in new technologies 
are the result when the potential need for technologies with new attributes looms 
large. 
Technological Choices in the World Energy System 
We have shown that it is possible to model the selection among a handful of com-
peting technologies in an isolated market. But at larger scales-the energy system 
of a whole economy, region, or the planet-models that fully and realistically 
incorporate endogenous technological change are still impossible. Relationships 
between the wide array of factors that determine technological choices are poorly 
understood, and the need to model decision making by thousands of agents and 
for hundreds of possible technology combinations exceeds available modeling and 
computational capacity. 
We illustrate that a stylized application of the technological learning concept 
can improve the status quo by focusing on the main application of macro-level 
modeling: the generation of scenarios and use of varied scenarios to illustrate 
policy choices. One measure of technological change in such scenarios is the level 
and rate of decarbonization. The historical record shows a striking and consistent 
trend of decarbonization, driven by regular radical changes in energy systems. 
With a rhythmic 70-year period, the major fuel sources have been progressively 
replaced; by coincidence, each has been progressively lighter in carbon per unit 
of energy released when burned. Coal, the dominant fuel from 1880 to 1950, 
contains approximately one hydrogen atom per carbon atom. Today's dominant 
fuel, oil, contains two hydrogen atoms for every carbon. The hydrogen-to-carbon 
ratio in natural gas (methane), the major primary fuel whose share is rising most 
rapidly today, is 4 to 1. More recently also, energy sources that have no direct 
carbon emissions, such as hydropower and nuclear fission, lighten our carbon diet. 
Hydrogen-rich fuels release more energy for every carbon atom that is oxidized to 
C02 during combustion. 
As shown in Figure 5, the carbon-to-primary-energy ratio for the world has 
declined at 0.3%/year since 1850. For illustration, Figure 5 also includes the longer 
and probably more accurate historical record for the United States, with an average 
0.25% decarbonization per year since 1800. In some countries decarbonization has 
been relatively rapid-in France, for example, nuclear power has replaced fossil 
fuels as the supplier of nearly all electricity. On average, French decarbonization 
of primary energy was 2.2%/year during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Measured as the carbon intensity of the economy, rather than the energy sys-
tem, the rate of decarbonization has been even more rapid because of structural 
changes toward less-energy-intensive economic activities, such as the shift from 
manufacturing to services. In the United States, the specific carbon dioxide emis-
sions per unit value added have declined by almost an order of magnitude during 
the last 2 centuries, from "'2.5 kg of elemental carbon per US$1 of gross domestic 
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Figure 5 Decarbonization of the energy supply. The ratio of carbon per unit of energy has 
steadily declined in the United States and the world. Source: reference 66. Also shown are 
the carbon intensity of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IS92a baseline and 
the IIASA Dynamic Technology (DT) projections. 
product (at 1990 prices) in 1800 to "'0.3 kg of elemental carbon per US$1 of gross 
domestic product in 1990. In other terms, the economic "productivity" of carbon 
increased by more than 1 % per year during the last 2 centuries. Decarbonization 
has not autonomously eliminated carbon from the economy, but it has steadily 
softened the economy's impact on the atmosphere. For example, if the fuel mix 
of the 1920s powered the American economy today, then annual carbon emis-
sions would be more than 300 million metric tons (24%) higher. For comparison, 
those averted American emissions total more than today's annual industrial carbon 
emissions from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Mexico combined (67). 
Do the scenarios generated by global models correspond with historically ob-
served decarbonization? Most scenario analysis begins with a baseline scenario-
often termed "business as usual"-which is the output from a model that includes 
no drastic changes in technologies or policies in response to the particular con-
cern that is the subject of the analysis (e.g. greenhouse warming). Those baseline 
scenarios are used as the cornerstone for subsequent policy analysis. The baseline 
scenario of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the most widely ref-
erenced such baseline scenario, known as IS92a, illustrates the generic approach 
(see Table 1). Because highly aggregated macroeconomic models generate these 
scenarios, radical technological change is absent, and the future is assumed to be 
merely the result of compounded marginal changes to today's energy system. Just 
as coal was the principal fossil energy source "'50 years ago, in 2100 the world 
of IS92a is also principally (47%) powered by coal. Thus, based on the IS92a 
scenario, the energy delivered is just as carbon intensive as today. In 1990, every 
Ul 
~ 
0 
TABLE 1 Global energy scenarios and technological changea 
Cl 
Conventional baseline scenarios MACRO-MESSAGE scenarios (this paper) 
"' C: 1990 levels tli 
Scenario attributes at year (observed) IPCC IS92a WEC/IIASA series A2 Baseline DT r tTl 
"' World income (10 12 1990 USO, 20.9 • 
market exchange rates) z ;I> 
2050 (% growth)b 92 (2.6%) 100 (2.7%) 117 (2.9%) 118 (2.9%) 0 ("), 
2100 (% growth)b 240 (2.3%) 310 (2.5%) 384 (2.7%) 393 (2.7%) tTl z 
0 
Final energy intensity 13.1 < 
-(106 J/1990 USD)c ("), 
• 
2050 6.8 7.2 5.8 5.7 < 
2100 3.6 3.5 2.5 2.8 n >--3 
0 
Primary energy (10 18 J) 381 
"' 
2050 930 1040 1100 990 
2100 1500 1900 1700 1800 
Primary energy, share of coal 24%/22% 
and zero carbond 
2050 37%121% 37%/27% 31%132% 4%150% 
2100 47%130% 38%151% 42%146% 0.4%177% 
Carbon emissions (10 15 g ofC)e 6.2 
2050 13 15 16 9.5 
2100 20 22 25 8.5 
Sulfur emissions (10 12 g of Sf 60 
2050 JOI 
2100 123 
Sulfur/carbon ratio 10 
(g of S per kg of C) 
2050 10 
2100 6.2 
Radiative forcing (Wm-2)f 2.6-1.3 = l.3g 
2050 5.7-2 = 3.7 
2100 8.2-2 = 6.2 
85 
160 
5.7 
7.4 
6-1.5 = 4.5 
9-2.3 = 6.7 
170 
240 
11 
9.6 
6.5-2.4 = 4.1 
10.3-2.9 = 7.4 
17 
11 
1.8 
1.3 
5.6-0.9 = 4.7 
6.9-0.8 = 6.1 
'The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) IS92a baseline scenario (48) envisions only marginal changes in present technologies. Thus, the future energy system appears similar 
to that of the present and is heavily based on coal. Using the principles of technological learning applied in the micro-scale model (Figures 3 and 4), the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (llASA) group linked macroeconomic and technological-systems models to allow better incorporation of technological change. Conventional treatment of technology-as 
a marginal extension of the past-yields a scenario similar to that of IS92: the llASA-WEC Series A2 scenario. The addition of technological learning yields a dynamic technology (DT) 
scenario (73), with lower carbon and sulfur emissions even without assumptions about environmental policy constraints. Unlike the conventional baseline scenarios,decarbonization(Figure 5) 
continues into the future (26). 
b Average global annual growth rate since 1990. 
'Intensity of final energy is a measure of the economy's efficiency; it reflects direct improvements in the efficiency with which energy is used to make a given economic ouiput (product 
or service) as well as structural change (e.g. shifts from energy-intensive manufacturing to service-oriented economy). IPCC values are for "secondary energy," which is comparable in 
definition of "final energy" in the WEC and llASA studies (i.e. heat content of energy after conversion and distribution). 
dThese two parameters are indicators of change in technology and the fuel mix. For IPCC. "coal" primary energy is not reported; the values here are for "solid" energy. "Zero carbon" is 
assumed to be nuclear and renewable energy; in none of the scenarios is carbon "scrubbed" from flue gases. 
'Carbon and sulfur from industrial processes only, mainly the burning of fossil fuels and biomass for energy and as feedstocks. IPCC reports slightly higher (70 x I 0 12 g of S) anthropogenic 
emissions of sulfur. 
'Increase in radiative forcing since the preindustrial era ( ~ 1765). Cells show net increase in radiative forcing from carbon and other greenhouse gases (including indirect effects such as 
stratospheric water vapor and ozone) minus the negative forcing from sul Fur (direct and indirect effects). Values computed with MAGI CC model and added to 1990 forcing levels to yield 
total increase in forcing. 
8Values for 1990 used in calculations here; however, note that sulfur forcing is uncertain. IPCC ( 195, figure 6.19) reports less intense negative sulfur forcing (-0.8 W m- 2). 
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106 joules (MJ) of primary energy released 17.4 g of carbon, which decreases 
slightly in the scenario to 14.1 g of C/MJ of primary energy by 2050. Thereafter, 
decarbonization in IS92a stagnates and reaches a value of 13.6 g of C/MJ by 2100. 
Sulfur associated with coal deposits is also burned, fouling the air and acidifying 
downwind ecosystems. The ratio of sulfur emissions to carbon is thus also high 
in the world of IS92a. 
Improved representation of technological change can yield scenarios that are 
more consistent with history. Here we illustrate one approach. Collaborators at 
IIASA have linked a conventional macroeconomic model-an 11-region version 
of the widely used MACRO model (68)-with MESSAGE (69, 70), a detailed 
model of regional and global energy systems, with technology parameters based 
on the IIASA technology database, which contains >1600 technologies (71, 72). 
(For details of the models see 73; for more on such linkage techniques see 74.) The 
IIASA approach partially solves the classic top-down and bottom-up dichotomy 
of energy models. It allows an estimation of the macro-economic losses that re-
sult, e.g. when carbon constraints are applied to the economy (a strength of top-
down, macroeconomic models), and it also allows calculation of the minimum cost 
suite of technologies needed to meet given constraints (a strength of bottom-up 
technological-system models). 
The IIASA team first used this coupled model to generate a baseline scenario 
that mimics the IS92a baseline scenario and then made one revision: the addition 
of technological learning to yield a "dynamic technology (DT)" scenario (73). 
As in the micro model discussed above, which endogenized technological learn-
ing for a single agent selecting between three technologies, the team divided all 
technologies considered in the MESSAGE model into three categories-mature 
(existing), incremental, and radical. The investment cost for existing technologies 
does not vary; the cost of investing in incremental technologies declines 15% for 
every doubling of installed capacity; and the cost of radical technologies declines 
30% for every doubling. For example, advanced coal power plants (an "incre-
mental technology") decline in cost to US$1200/kW(e), whereas total installed 
capacity more than doubles. Solar PVs (a "radical" technology) decline in cost 
from US$5000/kW(e) in 1990 to ,..._,US$500/kW(e) as installed PV capacity rises 
from practically zero today to '""100 GW by the end of the twenty-first century. 
[Computational limits required an iterative process that is consistent with the prin-
ciple of learning but did not confront the mathematical and computational barriers 
to a model that simultaneously solves all parameters (26, 75, 76).] 
The result of these simple adjustments to the representation of technology has 
little effect on the macroeconomic outputs of the linked model. Because en-
ergy costs (per unit of economic output) are lower and investment is higher, the 
world economy is slightly larger than in the baseline scenario, which already pro-
jected even more robust economic growth than in the bullish IS92a scenario. But 
unlike the baseline and IS92a scenario, the wealthy future of the DT scenario 
is also relatively clean. Despite declining costs for advanced coal power plants, 
MESSAGE shifts to even less costly advanced gas plants-that shift is already 
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evident in today's energy markets-and then to solar and other zero carbon fuels. 
Until 2060, the share of gas as a transition fuel for electric generation rises in 
this scenario. Coal and biomass, which supply a growing share of transport fuel 
(methanol and ethanol) and electricity in the baseline scenario, give way to solar-
based energy sources, including hydrogen, and new nuclear power technologies 
such as inherently safe, modular, high-temperature reactor designs. By 2100, de-
centralized (i.e. nongrid) energy generation technologies supply two-thirds of all 
electricity demand. This category consists of on-site solar PVs (30%), hydrogen 
cogeneration (25%), and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles that generate household elec-
tricity when parked ( 45% ). The hydrogen energy carrier can be generated in many 
ways-the most efficient emit little carbon and sulfur (e.g. steam reforming of 
natural gas) or no carbon and sulfur effluents at all (e.g. when splitting water, with 
solar or nuclear primary energy). 
The impact of the different technological selection in the DT scenario on envi-
ronmental quality is dramatic. Sulfur emissions decline sixfold from 1990 levels 
by 2100, and world carbon emissions rise only slightly (20%). By 2100, only 
4 g of carbon are released per MJ of primary energy supply, which is an average 
rate of decarbonization of 1.3%/year (threefold the historical value). With the 
widely used MAGICC climate model (77-80), we estimate the future concentra-
tion of carbon dioxide and greenhouse forcing for all the scenarios discussed here. 
In the baseline scenario, carbon concentrations rise to 800 parts per million by 
volume (ppmv) from 355 ppmv in 1990. Carbon concentrations also rise in the 
DT scenario, but more slowly-by 2100 the concentration is only 556 ppmv or 
approximately equal to the 550 ppmv long-term target for carbon concentrations 
proposed by European Union policy makers and widely discussed in the prepa-
rations for the Kyoto climate change conference in December 1997 (81). That 
target was widely dismissed as infeasible by mainstream observers, who view the 
world through an IS92a-like lens. But here we show that plausible representation 
of technology-unlike the world of IS92a-yields a future in which that target 
could be met. 
It is interesting that greenhouse forcing (and thus global warming) in the DT 
scenario remains high--only 20% less intense than in the baseline scenario. High 
sulfur in the baseline scenario masks nearly half the greenhouse forcing from 
carbon dioxide (caused by the cooling effect from sulfate aerosols), an effect that 
disappears with drastically declining sulfur emissions and acid rain impacts. The 
ratio of sulfur (g) to carbon (hg) drops to ,.._, 1--one-tenth that of the baseline 
scenario----as coal is nearly extinguished from the economy. Low-sulfur oil and 
natural gas are used as transition fuels to a future hydrogen economy, but those 
fuels also decline near the end of the scenario. In light of these effects of radical 
technological change, perhaps policy makers should set long-term targets for global 
warming based on the problem at hand (radiative forcing) rather than imperfect 
proxies (carbon concentrations). 
Obviously these scenarios, which are summarized in Table l, depend vitally 
on the assumptions that drive the models. Our intention here is only to illustrate 
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a simple but crucial point: plausible improvements to how technology costs and 
choices are modeled yields dramatically different models and long-term scenar-
ios. Typically, models induce technological change only through resource con-
straints. Our approach is more consistent with the view that investments into 
improved technological knowledge are the main driver of long-term productiv-
ity growth and technological innovation. Rather than resource depletion, in our 
view technological changes emerge from demands for new energy services, which 
create incentives for investments in innovation and niche market application, 
which lead to learning, declining costs, and then widespread diffusion. These 
processes yield radical technological changes-shifts in clusters, such as from oil 
today to a hydrogen economy late next century--0ver long time scales, which 
are also characteristic of global change. Similar shifts in technology clusters, 
primary energy sources, and energy carriers are evident in the historical record 
(61, 82, 83). 
Conclusions 
Across a wide range of intellectual and political views one view is shared: In 
the long run, technology is the factor that most governs growth of the economy, 
the cost and availability of services such as mobility and food, and the impacts 
on the environment. Luddites view that as the problem, and enthusiasts embrace 
technology as the solution. Yet, treatment of technological change in models and 
scenarios to analyze global environmental changes has been unsatisfactory, and 
the analysis here suggests some promising avenues forward, with three findings 
in particular. 
First, adding technological change to models can be aided by identifying sys-
tematic properties of technologies in the historical record, which include learning 
curves and characteristic learning rates. However, to make those curves more 
useful they should be modified to include not only "learning by doing"-which 
begins in niche markets and continues (for successful technologies) with pervasive 
diffusion-but also R&D, which is crucial during the earlier stages of technolog-
ical development. The resulting convenient formulation requires data on public 
and private investments; additional case studies are urgently needed to gather such 
comprehensive data for more technologies. 
Second, technological change is the consequence of investments that are made 
for two reasons-expectation that new technologies can be made more competitive, 
and to hedge against many uncertain risks. It is feasible to solve the nonconvex, 
stochastic optimization problems associated with a model of such uncertain learn-
ing processes. Such a model yields S-shaped patterns of technological dynam-
ics that are consistent with the historical record and diffusion theory. Moreover, 
the model endogenously generates radical departures from existing technological 
practices-a zero carbon future without policy constraints on carbon, and even 
more rapid decarbonization when modest and uncertain carbon constraints are in-
cluded. Neither outcome is the result of resource constraints, which is the main 
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mechanism for radical technological change in conventional models that do not 
incorporate endogenous mechanisms of technological change. We do not contend 
that the carbon problem will thus autonomously solve itself. But the illustration 
underscores that new technologies can penetrate the market even if they are initially 
a factor of 40 (or more) more expensive than the existing dominant technology. 
The model suggests that a strategy of investing in technological development is 
rational and optimal when risks must be diversified, especially when there is even 
a small probability of a significant emissions constraint in the future. If the model 
included the varied other benefits of diversification and the costs of environmental 
problems, such as urban smog or regional acidification, that are caused by the same 
processes that cause carbon emissions, the estimated benefits of diverse investment 
in new energy systems should grow further. 
Third, we have also demonstrated that it is possible to include a stylized rep-
resentation of technological change in macro-level models of the world's energy 
system. Most models project patterns of technological change that are gradual-
the future, by assumption, is a marginal change from the present. The simple 
micro-level model developed at IIASA can endogenously generate plausible pat-
terns of technological change that can then be used to inform a more detailed, 
coupled macroeconomic-systems engineering model of the world's energy sys-
tem. The coupled model can yield radical technological dynamics, resulting in 
much lower emissions of carbon and sulfur. This approach still does not fully 
endogenize technological change at a high level of regional and sectoral detail, but 
conceptually that is now possible. Computational and mathematical bottlenecks 
should soon be solvable. 
The results suggest that, when confronted with uncertainties-such as whether 
stringent action to slow global warming or other environmental externalities will 
be needed-that it is socially rational to diversify technologies. Insofar as societies 
today increasingly consider the likely need for long-term constraints on carbon, 
they should focus attention on incentives to diversify the portfolio of especially rad-
ical technologies that will be required if it proves necessary to cut carbon emissions 
sharply in the future. Near-term investments can yield those technologies, with 
commercially competitive cost and performance, on the time scales (>5 decades) 
that are relevant for global change. And it is plausible to project a century-long 
transition to a practically zero carbon emissions that appears to eliminate (today's) 
fears about energy-related externalities without any extra cost in the long-term. 
But it remains difficult to assess the probability of such developments. 
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